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Abstract — This paper reviews the fundamentals and 
security issues of WiMAX networks addressed in relevant 
standards and several papers.  At first a global overview of 
the WiMAX technology is provided followed by a security 
concerns and problems associated to the WiMAX/IEEE 
802.16 broadband wireless technology. Then an explanation 
of security vulnerabilities and threats mentioned in the 
available literature is presented along with possible solutions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
iMax (Worldwide Interoperability of Microwave 
Access), also known as the IEEE 802.16 protocol, 
is the latest standard for wireless networks. It was 
established in 1999 to prepare specifications for 
broadband wireless metropolitan area networks. The first 
802.16 standard was approved in December 2001 and was 
followed by three amendments: 802.16a, 802.16b and 
802.16c. In 2004 the 802.16-2004 standard (IEEE-SA, 
2006) was released and the earlier 802.16 documents 
including the a/b/c amendments were withdrawn. An 
amendment to 802.16-2004, IEEE 802.16e-2005 (formerly 
known as IEEE 802.16e), addressing mobility, was 
concluded in 2005. This implemented a number of 
enhancements to 802.16-2004, including better support for 
Quality of Service, Security and the use of Scalable 
OFDMA, and is sometimes called “Mobile WiMAX”, 
after the WIMAX forum.  
Currently active WiMAX amendments are: 802.16e-
2005- Mobile 802.16; 802.16f-2005- Management 
Information Base; 802.16g-2007- Management Plane 
Procedures and Services; 802.16k-2007- Bridging of 
802.16 (an amendment to 802.1D). There are several 
amendments under development: 802.16h- Improved 
Coexistence Mechanisms for License-Exempt Operation; 
802.16i- Mobile Management Information Base; 802.16j- 
Multihop Relay Specification; 802.16Rev2- Consolidate 
802.16-2004, 802.16e, 802.16f, 802.16g and possibly 
802.16i into a new document. IEEE 802.16 Task Group m 
(TGm) is working on new amendment: 802.16m-
Advanced Air Interface. Proposed work plan would allow 
completion of the standard by December 2009 for 
approval by March 2010. 
In the IEEE 802.11 technology, security was added 
later. In IEEE 802.16, security has been considered as the 
main issue during the design of the protocol. However, 
security mechanism of the IEEE 802.16 (WiMAX) still 
remains a question. WiMAX is relatively a new 
technology; not deployed widely to justify the evidence of 
threats, risk and vulnerability in real situations. This paper 
will address the security aspects of the IEEE 802.16 
Standard and point out the security vulnerabilities, threats 
and risks associated with this standard. 
II. SECURITY SOLUTIONS 
IEEE 802.16 security specifications can mainly be 
found within the MAC layer. Security within the MAC 
layer is called the security sublayer. Its goal is to provide 
access control and confidentiality of the data link. Figure 1 
shows IEEE 802.16 security sublayer. The separate 
security sublayer provides authentication, secure key 
exchange, and encryption. 
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Fig. 1. IEEE 802.16 security sublayer [1] 
 
When two parties establish a link, they are protected via 
a set of protocols that ensure confidentiality and unique 
access of the authorized parties. The unique handshaking 
between the two entities; namely base station (BS) and 
subscriber station (SS), is done at the MAC layer through 
security sublayer, which is based on the following 
concepts [2]: 
Security associations: A security association (SA) is a 
set of security information parameters that a BS and one or 
more of its client SSs share in order to support secure 
communications. Data SA has a 16bit SA identifier, a 
Cipher (DES in CBC mode) to protect the data during 
transmission over the channel and two traffic encryption 
keys (TEKs) to encrypt data: one is the current operational 
key and the other is TEK [3]. When the current key 
expires, TEK a 2bit key identifiers is used. A 64bit 
IEEE 802.16 Security Issues: A Survey 
Mitko Bogdanoski, Pero Latkoski, Aleksandar Risteski, Borislav Popovski  
Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Information Technologies 
Ss. Cyril and Methodius University 
Skopje, Macedonia 
mitko.bogdanoski@gmail.com, {pero, acerist, borop}@feit.ukim.edu.mk 
 
W 
199
 initialization vector (IV) is used for each TEK.  
Three types of SAs are defined [4,5]: primary, static, 
and dynamic. Each manageable SS establishes a Primary 
Security association during the initialization process. 
Static SAs are provisioned within the BS. Dynamic SAs 
are used for transport connections when needed. Both 
Static and Dynamic can be shared by multiple SSs. It may 
use separate SAs for uplink and downlink channels [6]. 
BS ensures that each SS has access only to its authorized 
SAs. 
Public key infrastructure (PKI): The WiMAX 
standard uses the Privacy and Key Management Protocol 
for securely transferring keying material between the base 
station and the mobile station. The privacy key 
management (PKM) protocol is responsible for privacy, 
key management, and authorizing an SS to the BS. The 
initial draft for WiMAX mandates the use of PKMv1 [6], 
which is a one-way authentication method. PKMv1 
requires only the SS to authenticate itself to the BS, which 
poses a risk for a Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack.  
To overcome this issue, PKMv2 was proposed (later 
adopted by 802.16e), which uses a mutual (two-way) 
authentication protocol [5]. Here, both the SS and the BS 
are required to authorize and authenticate each other. 
PKMv2 is preventing from the following [7]: BS and SS 
impersonations, MITM attack and Key exchange issue. 
PKMv2 authentication/authorization method is shown in 
Figure 2.  
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Fig. 2. The 2-way authentication and authorization of 
PKMv2 [8] 
 
PKMv2 supports the use of the Rivest-Shamir-
Adlerman (RSA) public key cryptography exchange. The 
RSA public key exchange requires that the mobile station 
establish identity using either a manufacturer-issued X.509 
digital certificate or an operator-issued credential such as a 
subscriber identity module (SIM) card. The X.509 digital 
certificate contains the mobile station's Public-Key (PK) 
and its MAC address. The mobile station transfers the 
X.509 digital certificate to the WiMAX network, which 
then forwards the certificate to a certificate authority 
(Figure 3). The certificate authority validates the 
certificate, thus validating the user identity.  
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Fig. 3. Public Key Infrastructure 
 
Once the user identity is validated, the WiMAX 
network uses the public key to create the authorization 
key, and sends the authorization key to the mobile station. 
The mobile station and the base station use the 
authorization key to derive an identical encryption key that 
is used with the advanced encryption standard (AES) 
algorithm.  
Authentication: Authentication is the process of 
validating a user identity and often includes validating 
which services a user may access. The authentication 
process typically involves a supplicant (that resides in the 
mobile station), an authenticator (that may reside in the 
base station or a gateway), and an authentication server 
(Figure 4). 
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Fig. 4. EAP-based authentication 
 
WiMAX uses the Extensible Authentication Protocol 
(EAP) to perform user authentication and access control. 
EAP is actually an authentication framework that requires 
the use of "EAP methods" to perform the actual work of 
authentication. The network operator may choose an EAP 
method such as EAP-TLS (Transport Layer Security), or 
EAP-TTLS MS-CHAP v2 (Tunneled TLS with Microsoft 
Challenge-Handshake Authentication Protocol version 2). 
The messages defined by the EAP method are sent from 
the mobile station to an authenticator. The authenticator 
then forwards the messages to the authentication server 
using either the RADIUS or DIAMETER protocols [9].  
Data privacy and integrity: WiMAX uses the AES to 
produce ciphertext. AES takes an encryption key and a 
counter as input to produce a bitstream. The bitstream is 
then XORed with the plaintext to produce the ciphertext 
(Figure 5).  
AES algorithm is the recommendation of 802.16e 
security sub-layer, since it can perform stronger protection  
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from theft of service and data across broadband wireless 
mobile network. Besides CCM-Mode and ECB-Mode 
AES algorithm supported in 802.16-2004, 802.16e 
supports three more AES algorithms: CBC-Mode AES, 
CTR-Mode AES and AES-Key-Wrap. 
III. THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES 
In WiMAX, security threats apply to both the PHY and 
MAC layers. Possible PHY level attacks include jamming 
of a radio spectrum, causing denial of service to all 
stations, and flooding a station with frames to drain its 
battery. Currently, there are no efficient techniques 
available to prevent PHY layer attacks. Therefore, the 
focus of WiMAX security is completely at the MAC level 
[10]. In this section, we discuss some of the open security 
threats and vulnerabilities in the WiMAX networks. 
A. Physical Layer Threats and Vulnerabilities 
802.16 security is implemented as a sublayer at the 
bottom of MAC layer in order to protect data exchanged 
between the MAC layer and the PHY layer. In essence, it 
does not protect the PHY layer itself against the attacks 
which target the inherent vulnerability of wireless links. 
Jamming and scrambling can be the form of attack to 
the PHY as the WiMAX 802.16 is defenseless. Jamming 
is achieved by introducing a source of noise strong enough 
to significantly reduce the capacity of the WiMAX 
channel. The information and equipment required to 
perform jamming are not difficult to acquire. Scrambling 
[10] is similar to jamming but this usually instigated for 
short intervals of time and is targeted to specific WiMAX 
frames or parts of frames. WiMAX scramblers can 
selectively scramble control or management messages 
with the aim of affecting the normal operation of the 
network. Slots of data traffic belonging to the targeted SSs 
can be scrambled selectively, forcing them to retransmit.  
Another typical attack against the PHY layer, so called 
water torture attack [6], pushes a SS to drain its battery or 
consume computing resources by sending bogus frames. 
This type of attack against a mobile station could be even 
more destructive than a typical Denial-of-Service (DoS) 
attack against a wired machine because portable devices 
are likely to have limited resources.  
In the mesh mode, 802.16 is also vulnerable to a replay 
attack in which an attacker maliciously resends valid 
frames that the attacker has intercepted in the middle of 
forwarding (relaying) process. 
The PHY layer attacks can be prevented or mitigated by 
several trivial countermeasures. Increasing the power of 
signals can resist jamming attacks. For this, monitoring 
equipment can be used to detect radio jamming, and upon 
an abnormal state of radio spectrum the power of signals 
is increased in order to override malicious signals. 
According to [10], the bandwidth of signals can be 
increased by using spreading techniques such as frequency 
hopping spread spectrum (FHSS) or direct sequence 
spread spectrum (DSSS). A sophisticate mechanism 
discarding bogus frames is needed to avoid running out of 
battery or computational resources by the water torture 
attack mentioned earlier. The latest 802.16 standard adds 
support for mobility of SS. This could make 
802.16/WiMAX more vulnerable to these attacks against 
the PHY layer because an attacker does not necessarily 
have to reside in a fixed point and monitoring the anomaly 
becomes more difficult. Though intended scrambling is 
more complex than jamming, the probability for 
scrambling to occur is possible due to natural noise 
interruption and the availability periods of the attack. 
These attacks can be unveiled by analyzing discrepancies 
in the systems performance. 
B. MAC Layer Threats and Vulnerabilities 
There are several significant shortcomings of 802.16 
security implemented at the MAC layer. To ultimately set 
up secure transport connections, 802.16 exploits a 
sequential two-way transactions for controlling, 
authorization, and authentication. The first problem is that, 
during the basic and primary connection, MAC 
management messages are sent in plain-text and not 
properly authenticated. Thus, the management message 
can be hijacked over the air and forged by an attacker in 
the middle. By doing so, the attacker can prepare for 
further attacks. Secondly, 802.16 uses the X.509 
certificate, the standard for PKI, that defines a certification 
path validation to identify a genuine SS. It uses RSA 
encryption with SHA-1 hashing. Typically, a SS’s 
certificate is pre-configured by the manufacture and 
persistent on the machine. Thus, the certificate could be 
stolen and tampered by an adversary unless it is kept 
secret. 
 Many serious threats arise from its authentication 
scheme. WiMAX supports unilateral device level 
authentication [10], which can be implemented in a similar 
way as Wireless-fidelity (Wi-Fi) MAC filtering based on 
the hardware device address. Therefore, address sniffing 
and spoofing make a SS masquerade attack possible. In 
addition, the lack of mutual authentication makes a MITM 
attack from a rogue BS possible. However, a successful 
MITM attack is difficult because of the time division 
multiple access (TDMA) model in WiMAX.  The attacker 
must transmit at the same time as the legitimate BS using a 
much higher power level in order to “hide” the legitimate 
signal. Furthermore, WiMAX supports mutual 
authentication at user network level based on the generic 
EAP [11]. EAP variants, EAP- TLS (transport layer 
security) (X.509 certificate based) [12] and EAP- SIM 
[13], are supported. 
Eavesdropping of management messages is a critical 
threat for users and a major threat to a system. For 
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 example, an attacker could use this vulnerability to verify 
the presence of a victim at its location before perpetrating 
a crime. Additionally, it might be used by a competitor to 
map the network. Another major vulnerability is the 
encryption mode based on data encryption standard 
(DES). The 56 bit DES key is easily broken with modern 
computers by brute force attack. Furthermore, the DES 
encryption mode includes no message integrity or replay 
protection functionality and is thus vulnerable to active or 
replay attacks. The secure AES encryption mode should 
be preferred over DES [14]. Eavesdropping mostly affects 
the transfer of information and rarely causes system 
outage. The assessment of the eavesdropping threat is 
minor to the system but high for the user. 
Countermeasures for minor threats are not required.  
The masquerading threat of the BS or SSs is enabled 
when authentication weaknesses are present. Identity theft 
and Rogues BS are specific techniques of masquerading. 
Identity theft is a severe threat to unlicensed services 
supported by WiMAX [10,15]. A fake device can use the 
hardware address of another registered device by 
intercepting management messages over the air. Once 
succeeded, an attacker can turn a BS into a rogue BS. A 
rogue BS can imitate a legitimate BS by confusing the 
associated SSs. Those SSs try to acquire WiMAX services 
from the rogue BS, resulting in degraded service or even 
service termination. Only for comparison, the Wi-Fi 
network employs carrier sense multiple access (CSMA), 
and thus identity theft has become one of the top security 
threats. The reason is that the attacker can easily capture 
the identity of a legitimate access point (AP) by listening 
to the CSMA process, which readily reveals information 
on the AP identity. The attacker can then construct a 
message by using the legitimate AP’s identity, wait until 
the medium is idle, and distribute the malicious message. 
Finally, there is a potential for DoS attacks because 
authentication operations trigger the execution of long 
procedures. For example, a DoS attack could flood a MS 
with a high number of messages to authenticate. Due to 
low computational resources, the MS will not be able to 
handle a large amount of invalid messages, rendering the 
DoS attack successful. The impact of this attack is 
classified as medium to the system as only time is affected 
at that level, but can be high for the user as it causes 
delays in the system responding to the individual’s 
requests. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have studied the security solutions, 
vulnerabilities and threats of IEEE 802.16 (WiMAX). It 
can be seen that WiMAX provides a robust user 
authentication, access control, data privacy and data 
integrity using sophisticated authentication and encryption 
technology. WiMAX has both a sophisticated set of 
security protocols in its security suite and advanced 
bandwidth allocation mechanisms, which makes it a 
suitable candidate for enterprise applications. 
On the other hand, it was found that WiMAX is subject 
to critical threats including jamming, eavesdropping and 
modification of management messages, masquerading as 
BS, and DoS attacks. 
Even though some issues are no longer valid since the 
recent amendments and security solutions in 802.16, some 
remain unsolved and need to be carefully reviewed to 
avoid the same mistake as 802.11/Wi-Fi.  
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